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RUMINATIONS ON RES JUDICATA
by
Zollie Steakley* and
Weldon U. Howell, Jr.**
I. GENERAL HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF RES JUDICATA
The doctrine of res adjudicata [sic] is plain and intelligible, and
amounts simply to this, that a cause of action once finally determined,
without appeal, between the parties, on the merits, by a competent tri-
bunal, cannot afterwards be litigated by new proceedings either before
same or any other tribunal.'
This characterization of res judicata, 2 as a simple, easily applied legal doc-
trine, may have been valid at one time; however, such a reputation was
short-lived. Disparate interpretation of the doctrine by courts and scholars
alike has transformed res judicata into a legal labyrinth.
The basic precept that an official determination upon a disputed fact or
state of facts should be regarded as final and conclusive between the parties
is a rule common to virtually every system of jurisprudence.3 Roman law
provided for an exceptio rei judicatae or plea of former judgment; 4 the plea
was available only when a subsequent controversy involved the same parties
and same point of law.5 This concept became a part of the jurisprudence
of England and was the forerunner of our res judicata principles of merger
and bar.6
A second branch of the doctrine, collateral estoppel, is the progeny of
medieval Germanic law. 7 This concept was based upon the principle that
determinations made in a prior suit were conclusive in a subsequent suit
founded upon a wholly different cause of action. The conclusive effect of
the first suit was based upon the statements of the party; thus, the parties
were estopped to assert the same facts in the second suit.a
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1. Foster v. The Richard Busteed, 100 Mass. 409, 412 (1868); 2 H. BLACK, JUDG-
MENTS § 504 (2d ed. 1902) [hereinafter cited as BLACK].
2. Literally, "res judicata" means "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon
or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1470
(rev. 4th ed. 1968).
3. 2 BLACK § 500.
4. Id. § 501.
5. Id.; Developments in the Law-Res Judicata, 65 HARv. L. REV. 818, 820
(1952) [hereinafter cited as Developments in the Law].
6. Developments in the Law 820.
7. Millar, The Historical Relation of Estoppel by Record to Res ludicata, 35 ILL.
L. REv. 41, 44 (1940).
8. Developments in the Law 820. A final judgment was required to make this
"estoppel by record" conclusive, even though the statements of the party, not the judg-
ment, estopped the party. The necessity of offering a final judgment in the subsequent
suit resulted in the inaccurate description of collateral estoppel as "estoppel by judg-
ment." 9 W. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 147-54 (3d ed. 1944); Develop-
ments in the Law 821.
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These two principles, merger/bar and collateral estoppel, are collectively
known as res judicata. Although the two wholly different concepts are
sometimes confused, courts have sought to establish and maintain the dis-
tinction. As early as 1876 the United States Supreme Court, in Cromwell
v. County of Sac,9 clearly distinguished between the effect of a prior judg-
ment '(as a bar) in a subsequent suit involving the same cause of action,
and its effect (as an estoppel) in a later suit involving a different claim
or cause of action. The Court in Cromwell stated:
In the former case, the judgment . . .constitutes an absolute bar
to -a subsequent action. It is a finality as to the claim or demand in
controversy, concluding parties and those in privity with them, not only
as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat
-the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter -which might
have been offered for that purpose ....
But where the second action between the same parties is upon -a dif-
ferent claim or demand, the judgment in the prior action operates as
an estoppel only as to those matters in issue or points controverted,
upon the determination of which the finding or verdict was rendered.10
Texas courts also recognized the distinction at an early date and in 1900,
the Texas Supreme Court adopted the language of Cromwell v. County of
Sac in the case of Hanrick v. Gurley."
The dichotomy in the principle of res judicata is now well recognized.
Where the same cause of action is involved in a subsequent suit, the plain-
tiff's cause of action in the first suit is merged into a final judgment (i.e.,
the cause of action dissolves) when the plaintiff prevails ;12 if the defendant
wins the first suit, the plaintiff is barred from bringing another action.' 3
The scope of merger/bar is not limited to matters actually litigated; the
judgment in the first suit precludes a second action not only on matters ac-
tually litigated, but also on matters which might have been litigated in the
first suit. 14 Merger and bar, also called "claim preclusion"' 5 or "technical""'
res judicata, have been codified in the Restatement,17 and there is little con-
ceptual difficulty in grasping the definition of the principles. The difficulty
arises when one attempts to apply the principles or to determine precisely
what constitutes a "cause of action" or "matters which might have been liti-
gated."
Collateral estoppel, which is also referred to as "issue preclusion,"' 8 ap-
plies to a subsequent suit involving a different cause of action. When the
9. 94 U.S. 351 (1876).
10. Id. at 352-53.
11. 93 Tex. 458, 56 S.W. 330 (1900). See also Permian Oil Co. v. Smith, 129
Tex. 413, 107 S.W.2d 564 (1937).
12. RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 47 (1942) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT].
13. Id. § 48.
14. Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351 (1876); Hanrick v. Gurley, 93 Tex.
458, 56 S.W. 330 (1900).
15. Vestal, Res Judicata/Preclusion by Judgment: The Law Applied in Federal
Courts, 66 MIcH. L. REv. 1723 (1968).
16. 103 U. PA. L. REv. 273, 274 (1954).
17. RESTATEMENT §§ 47, 48.
18. Vestal, supra note 15, at 1723.
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same issues or questions of fact arise in a subsequent suit, the first judgment
is conclusive as to those matters actually litigated and determined in the
former action.' 9 Thus, the party is "estopped" to relitigate or challenge
those facts or issues in the second suit.
In modern usage, the generic term "res judicata" is often used in reference
to the principles of merger/bar and collateral estoppel either collectively or
individually. The two principles are based upon identical policy considera-
tions, and there is an understandable overlap in the development of the doc-
trines. 20 In addition, there is often confusion between res judicata (generi-
cally speaking) and other legal doctrines which affect a party's rights in sub-
sequent litigation.
11. OTHER DOCTRINES DISTINGUISHED
The doctrines of law of the case, stare decisis, and election of remedies
are easily confused with res judicata. Each of these doctrines bears some
resemblance to res judicata; further, these doctrines are founded upon many
of the same policy considerations 21 as res judicata.
Law of the case is a rule establishing that an appellate court will not re-
consider its former adjudication of a question of law, raised on subsequent
appeal in the same case. 22  The doctrine relates only to questions of law
and is strictly confined to subsequent stages in the same case. 2 ' Law of
the case is easily distinguished from res judicata, as the latter doctrine is
generally concerned with the effect of a former judgment on a subsequent
and wholly independent proceeding.24
Stare decisis25 is a fundamental principle of the common law. Under this
doctrine, after a rule or proposition of law has been established by the Su-
preme Court or highest court in a state, such decision is generally accepted
as binding precedent in the same or lower ranking courts when the same
point is presented in a subsequent suit between different parties.26  Stare
decisis is high authority, but it is not absolutely binding; thus courts may
reconsider, modify or reverse former pronouncements of the law.27  Res ju-
19. RESTATEMENT § 68.
20. The primary inquiry in this Article is a determination of what constitutes a
"cause of action" for the purposes of merger and bar. While some of the discussion
is relevant to the subject of collateral estoppel, further development of that principle
is beyond the scope of this Article. For a comprehensive discussion of collateral estop-
pel, see McGlinchey, Collateral Estoppel in Texas, 4 Hous. L. REV. 73 (1966); Scott,
Collateral Estoppel by Judgment, 56 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1942); Vestal, supra note 15;
Developments in the Law.
21. See notes 34-43 intra, and accompanying text.
22. However, courts are not absolutely bound by their decisions on the prior appeal
and may permit a different holding if presented with exceptional circumstances. Bo-
mar v. Parker, 68 Tex. 435, 4 S.W. 599 (1887). This principle also stands for the
proposition that when an appellate court remands a case to a lower court for further
proceedings, that lower court must follow the rulings of the appellate court. Lone Star
Gas Co. v. State, 137 Tex. 279, 296, 153 S.W.2d 681, 691 (1941).
23. 2 A. FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS § 630 (5th ed. 1925) [hereinafter cited as
FREEMAN].
24. Id.
25. The term means literally "[t]o abide by, or adhere to, decided cases." BLACK'S
LAW DIcTIONARY 1577 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
26. Swilley v. McCain, 374 S.W.2d 871, 875 (Tex. 1964); 2 FREEMAN § 631.
27. von Moschzisker, Res Judicata, 38 YALE L.J. 299, 300 (1929).
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dicata does not enjoy the flexibility of stare decisis; once properly invoked,
res judicata is binding upon both the court and the litigants. 28  Stare decisis
involves only questions of law and applies only to the legal principles in a
case, while res judicata is concerned with the judgment and its effect on
the same parties in a subsequent proceeding.
An election of remedies exists when a party chooses between two or more
inconsistent remedies actually existing at the time that the election is made.2 9
When a party elects to pursue one of these remedies and fails, he is pre-
cluded from pursuing the remaining remedy. 0 For example, where one
holds a voidable contract and may rescind, or may affirm the contract and
sue for an amount under it, a suit on the contract constitutes an election
and is thus a waiver of the right to rescind.3' However, if the party mis-
conceives his right, or improperly attempts to pursue a right which is not
actually available and thus is defeated as a result of such error, his action
does not constitute a conclusive election and does not preclude his pursuing
an action based upon an inconsistent remedial right.3 2 Election of remedies
is founded upon estoppel principles and arises from action of the party, not
of the court; if the first remedy is pursued to judgment, res judicata would
attach and also preclude the second action.33
III. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
A judgment is a 'bar, not because a party has done some act which
precludes him from asserting a right or title; it is properly a bar on
principles of public policy, because the peace and order of society, the
structure of our judicial system, and the principles of our government
require that a matter once litigated should not be again drawn in ques-
tion between the same parties or their privies.3 4
It is this strong public policy which makes res judicata a fundamental con-
cept in most systems of jurisprudence.35 Authorities have enunciated sev-
eral policy factors which justify the application of res judicata. A review
of these considerations is appropriate, because these several factors consti-
tute an important element in the practical application of the various con-
ceptual models of cause of action.88
28. Id.
29. White v. Bell, 290 S.W. 849, 851 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1927), error ref.
30. Whitney v. Parish of Vernon, 154 S.W. 264 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston
1913), error ref.
31. Id. at 267.
32. White v. Bell, 290 S.W. 849, 851 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1927), error ref.
33. Developments in the Law 823. It is possible that both res judicata and elec-
tion of remedies would apply to the same case; thus, a prior suit on one theory, pursued
to final judgment, not only would constitute an election of remedies but also would be
res judicata on a second suit based upon a remedy previously available. 2 FREEMAN
§ 631.
The doctrine of preclusion of inconsistent positions is closely related to election of
remedies; the latter generally applies to a choice between available theories, while the
former precludes the assertion of factually contradictory statements. Developments in
the Law 823-24. On the other hand, some may consider the doctrine of preclusion
of inconsistent positions as incorporating both of these notions under the same heading.
2 FREEMAN § 631.
34. 2 FREEMAN § 626.
35. 2 BLACK § 500.
36. See text accompanying notes 44-67 infra.
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Freedom from Vexatious Litigation. "A man should not be twice vexed
for the same cause."37 In reality, all litigation would appear to vex a de-
fendant, and res judicata is one method available to minimize the inconven-
ience and annoyance of multiple lawsuits. When a party invokes the ma-
chinery of the judicial system against another party, he should resolve all
related matters in controversy in that proceeding. Thus, failure or neglect
in asserting a claim is no excuse, and a party should not be allowed to fur-
ther harass the same defendant with related matters already resolved, or
which could have been resolved in the prior action.38
Danger of Double Recovery. The desire to prevent a double recovery by
any party is a fundamental reason for the doctrine of res judicata. If a
party prevails in his first action against a defendant, the availability of a
second proceeding on the same matter necessarily makes a duplicate or over-
lapping recovery possible. It seems most improbable that any court would
consciously allow a double recovery on the same cause of action; however,
a court's application of what appears to be a logical concept of cause of
action in one situation might well serve as a precedent for a double recovery
in other situations.8 9
Desirability of Stable Decisions. The relative stability of a court's decision
affects individuals and society alike. An individual should be able to rely
upon the judgment rendered by a court; if subsequent litigation is allowed
on the same matter, unjust economic hardship to the individual might result.
Multiple proceedings on the same cause of action and the resulting instabil-
ity would endanger the marketability of property and clog the already over-
burdened judicial system. Further, such instability could not only engender
in the public a contemptuous attitude -toward the judicial system, but it
would also allow a previously unsuccessful litigant to disregard the court's
final judgment. 40
Economy of Court Time. A final rationale for the doctrine of res judicata
is judicial efficiency. In light of the growing problems in judicial administra-
tion, the amount of court time saved by operation of the doctrine should
overcome any possible misfortune to the party precluded from asserting a
claim in a subsequent action. In times past, a party might well assert each
common law action evolving from the same transaction in an individual suit.
Res judicata, in tandem with modern trial procedure, now minimizes the in-
convenience, unnecessary repetition, and waste of time resulting from such
a practice. 41
37. 2 FREEMAN § 626.
38. Benson v. Wanda Petroleum, 468 S.W.2d 361, 363 (Tex. 1971); see Cleary,
Res Judicata Reexamined, 57 YALE L.J. 339, 346 (1948); Note, Problems of Res Ju-
dicata Created by Expanding "Cause of Action" Under Code Pleading, 104 U. PA. L.
REv. 955, 962 (1956).
39. See Cleary, supra note 38, at 344-45.
40. See id. at 345-46; Developments in the Law 827-28.
41. See Developments in the Law 826-27. On the other hand, it has been argued
that a savings in court time is not a valid justification for application of res judicata.
The fact that the defense of res judicata may be waived belies the claim that the doc-
trine is an important time saver. If judges and courts are unable to meet the demands
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Policies Militating Against Res Judicata. Although res judicata is a princi-
ple deeply rooted in our jurisprudence and well justified by public policy,
there are certain considerations which do not favor the operation of the doc-
trine. When a party is limited to one proceeding, where two might have
been available absent res judicata, he may be unfairly limited in the amount
he is able to recover. Thus, where there is difficulty in adequately measur-
ing damages due to events subsequent to the trial, a party's legitimate claim
may be cut short by res judicata.
Further, there are some situations where multiple suits may be preferable
to a single cause of action. For example, should a creditor be forced to
sue simultaneously on all existing past due notes of the same debtor when
each has been executed individually? If the assignor of a claim has recov-
ered part of that claim on his own behalf, should res judicata preclude an
assignee from then asserting his remaining individual claim against the de-
fendant? Finally, the penalties of res judicata appear too harsh in some
situations; through application of a highly conceptualized doctrine and inno-
cent failure to assert a claim, one may be forever precluded from asserting
his claim, no matter how legitimate or substantial it may be.42  According
to one -writer, in certain situations the operation of res judicata is much like
one old vaudeville skit: Two men owned a cow. One killed his half, and
the other half died.43
IV. CONCEPTUAL THEORIES OF CAUSE OF ACTION
Leading cases on res judicata,44 the Restatement of Judgments,45 and
other recognized authorities 46 all explain the merger and bar concept of res
judicata in similar language. 47 These authorities speak of the effect of prior
judgments in barring or precluding the prosecution of a second action based
upon the same cause of action; further, the prior judgment is said to bar
not only matters actually litigated, but also matters which might have been
litigated in the first suit. It is the frequent use of these two phrases, "cause
of the system, why not expand the system rather than apply such doctrines? Cleary,
supra note 38, at 348-49.
42. See Developments in the Law 828-30; Note, supra note 38, at 970-72.
43. Cleary, supra note 38, at 346.
44. Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351 (1876); Hanrick v. Gurley, 93 Tex.
458, 56 S.W. 330 (1900); Foster v. Wells, 4 Tex. 101 (1849).
45. RESTATEMENT § 47, 48.
46. 2 BLACK § 504; 2 FREEMAN § 626.
47. Under traditional analysis, a prior judgment operates as a bar under the doc-
trine of res judicata when there exists a concurrence of four conditions or identities:
(1) identity in the thing sued for; (2) identity of the cause of action; (3) identity of
persons and parties to the action; (4) identity of the quality in the persons for or
against whom the claim is made. Philipowski v. Spencer, 63 Tex. 604, 606-07 (1885).
The "four identities" approach is still a valid method of determining whether the bar
or merger principle of res judicata should operate to preclude a second action. Most
authorities deal with bar and merger, at least to some degree, in terms of these identi-
ties. 46 AM. JuR. 2D Judgments § 404-14 (1969); 50 C.J.S. Judgments §§ 648-85(1947); 2 FREEMAN §3 670-708; 34 TEX. JuR. 21 Judgments § 492-504 (1962). The
discussion of merger and bar herein, which deals both with conceptual theories and
with application of the principles in Texas law, is intentionally limited to analysis of
only one of these identities, identity of the cause of action. The other identities are
not without problems; however, cause of action seems to be one of the most important
identities and certainly the most troublesome in terms of practical application.
[Vol. 28
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of action" and "matters which might have been litigated," which results in
the complexity and ambiguity in the law of merger and bar. As one scholar
stated:
[When we deal] with what might have been litigated in the former action,
however, we leave the workaday world and enter into a wondrous
realm of words, where results are obtained not by grubbing out facts
but by the application of incantations which change pumpkins into
coaches and one man's property into another's. The incantations are
the various definitions of what constitutes a cause of action.48
The conceptual models which follow are indicative of the numerous efforts
to comprehend and define these "incantations" murmured by courts and
scholars. 49
Individualized/Same Evidence Concept. Under this concept, a particular set
of facts which is sufficient to individualize a specific rule of law (and thus
distinguish it from any other claim against the same party) constitutes a
single cause of action. Thus, even a minimal alteration of material facts
may constitute a new cause of action, if the alteration makes available a
new rule of substantive law.50
This concept, also described as the same evidence test, has been described
as the "best and most invariable test" 51 for determining what constitutes a
cause of action. Under the same evidence test, there is but one cause of
action when the same evidence will support both the first and second ac-
tion.5 2
The definition of cause of action advocated long ago by Professor Mc-
Caskill also falls within the individualized concept area. McCaskill defined
a cause of action as follows: "It is that group of operative facts which, stand-
ing alone, would show a single right in the plaintiff and a single delict to
that right giving cause for the state, through its courts, to afford relief to
the party or parties whose right was invaded.15 3
This concept may appear in several guises; whether it is articulated in
terms of the individualized concept, the same evidence test or the group of
operative facts definition, the impact of this concept is manifest. This
"small-sized" cause of action generally restricts the operation of res judi-
cata;5 4 much like the ancient common law forms of action, this concept
strictly limits an action according to the rights enforced under it.55 While
48. Cleary, supra note 38, at 343.
49. In the examination of different concepts of cause of action, the authorities and
proponents of each are noted where applicable. However, the general classification
scheme is found in Schopflocher, What is a Single Cause of Action for the Purpose
of the Doctrine of Res Judicata?, 21 ORE. L. REV. 319 (1942) [hereinafter cited as
Schopflocher].
50. Id. at 323.
51. 2 FREEMAN § 687.
52. RESTATEMENT § 61; 2 FREEMAN § 687. But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS § 61 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973), in which the "same evidence" test is aban-
doned.
53. McCaskill, Actions and Causes of Action, 34 YALE L.J. 614, 638 (1925).
54. Cleary, supra note 38, at 340.
55. Keeton, Action, Cause of Action, and Theory of the Action in Texas, 11
TEXAS L. REv. 145, 146 (1933).
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acclaimed as a simple and consistent criterion for defining cause of action,56
this concept has also been criticized as being too narrow for practical appli-
cation and oblivious to important policy considerations. 57
Pragmatic Concept. A second concept, strongly advocated by Judge
Charles E. Clark, among others, defines a cause of action as:
such an aggregate of operative facts as will give rise to at least one
right of action, -but it is not limited to a single right (if it is ever pos-
sible to isolate one such right from others). The extent of the cause
is to be determined pragmatically 'by the court, having in mind the facts
and circumstances of the particular case. Such extent may be settled
by past precedents; but the controlling factor -will be the matter of
trial convenience, for that is the general purpose to be subserved by
these procedural rules.58
The primary criterion of this concept is a determination of whether the addi-
tional facts supplied in the second action are so closely related to the fact
situation of the prior action as to justify consideration of the two situations
as one operative unit.5 9 Thus, the court is not simply to inquire whether
the added facts establish a different rule of law in the second action (as
in the individualized concept); on the contrary, the court should consider
practicalities, such as trial convenience and common usage, in deciding
whether the first and second actions constitute one unified cause of action.60
The pragmatic concept, as the name implies, is considered a more prac-
tical approach. Indeed, if a layman were asked to define cause of action
in this context, he would probably articulate a definition resembling the
pragmatic concept."' However, this concept is not without criticism. While
operation of this concept does include consideration of the facts in each ac-
tion, reliance upon policy factors necessarily results in a more abstract prin-
56. 2 FREEMAN § 687.
57. Developments in the Law 825; Schopflocher 364; see text accompanying notes
34-43 supra for discussion of policy considerations.
58. C. CLARK, CODE PLEADING 137 (2d ed. 1947).
59. Schopflocher 323-24.
60. Id. There are two additional definitions, both of which are hybrid forms of
other concepts, which are best categorized under the pragmatic heading.
Pomeroy's definition of cause of action falls somewhere between the individualized
and pragmatic concepts. Pomeroy breaks down the judicial action into several ele-
ments: a primary right in the plaintiff, a corresponding duty devolving on the defend-
ant; a delict or wrong done by the defendant which consisted in a breach of such pri-
mary right and duty; a remedial right in favor of the plaintiff, and a remedial duty
resting on the defendant springing from this delict; and finally the remedy or relief
itself. As relevant here, Pomeroy advocates that the combination of facts showing a
primary right and duty, and the delict or wrong constitutes a cause of action. J. POM-
EROY, CODE REMEDIES: REMEDIES AND REMEDIAL RIGHTS §§ 346-47 (5th ed. 1929);
Keeton, supra note 55, at 147.
A second hybrid, the ad hoc policy determination, is a combination of the pragmatic
and broad procedural duty concepts (discussed at notes 63-67 infra and accompanying
text). While most courts at least pay lip service to some definitional approach, the
ad hoc policy determination concept simply stands for a case by case analysis of rele-
vant policy considerations. According to the individual circumstances of each situa-
tion, the court balances policy factors, discussed at notes 34-43 supra, and accompany-
ing text, and then decides whether to permit or prohibit prosecution of the second suit.
61. "This means that a lay or nonlegal grouping of the facts into a single unit,
as nonprofessional witnesses would naturally do, will be the most practicable." C.
CLARK, supra note 58, at 137. See also Keeton, supra note 55, at 147.
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ciple which is inherently unpredictable. Application of the concept must
necessarily depend on judicial discretion; thus, it affords little basis for con-
sistency and formulation of precedent.6 2
Broad Procedural Duty Concept. This concept contemplates that a party
should be required to join all claims in one action; the joinder should include
as many claims as possible under laws of procedure and principles of fair-
ness, notwithstanding the fact that the same, or perhaps two or more causes
of action are involved. This joinder assumes a close relationship between
the causes of action.68 In effect, the broad procedural duty concept
is merely a strict application of the principle that one is barred from reliti-
gating both matters actually litigated and matters which might have been
litigated. 64
This concept recognizes that a liberal or permissive attitude on joinder
translates into a very strict operation of res judicata; thus, "permission to
unite different causes of action in one complaint becomes a command."65
The concept is similar to the pragmatic concept in several respects; the closer
the fact situations in each proceeding, the more likely a party will be pre-
cluded from prosecuting the second action. 6 However, the preclusion from
asserting a second action is based upon a procedural duty to join actions,
not upon the doctrine of res judicata. For this reason, the court could con-
sider the equities of the situation, such as determining whether the party
has neglected a procedural duty, before imposing the procedural penalty.67
The procedural concept does offer a wholly different basis for its applica-
tion; however, the use of judicial discretion in determining observance of
procedural duty necessarily subjects the concept to those criticisms levelled
against the pragmatic concept.
V. DEVELOPMENT OF BAR, MERGER, AND THE
CAUSE OF ACTION IN TEXAS
Res judicata is firmly embedded in Texas law and as early as 1849 the
Texas Supreme Court recognized a former judgment as a bar in a subse-
quent proceeding.68  In another leading case 69 the dichotomy between the
doctrines of bar/merger and collateral estoppel was established. From these
early cases to the present, Texas courts have rendered numerous interpreta-
tions of bar and merger. While these cases have dealt with various aspects
of the doctrine, the discussion which follows focuses upon the most funda-
mental, yet most perplexing element of bar and merger, the determination
of what constitutes a cause of action. Rather than embark upon an exhaus-
62. Keeton, supra note 55, at 160; Schopflocher 324, 363; Developments in the
Law 825.
63. Schopflocher 324.
64. Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351 (1876); Hanrick v. Gurley, 93 Tex.




68. Foster v. Wells, 4 Tex. 101 (1849).
69. Hanrick v. Gurley, 93 Tex. 458, 56 S.W. 330 (1900).
1974]
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tive review of the many Texas cases which attempt to define a cause of
action, the discussion is confined to an eclectic group of cases. Through
analysis and classification of each case into one of the conceptual models
(individualized, pragmatic, and broad procedural duty), the discussion
traces the background and current status of the cause of action and explores
the trends likely to govern the treatment of the concept by Texas courts. 70
The case of Freeman v. McAninch7' serves as a touchstone for modern
interpretation of the cause of action in res judicata. In Freeman a prior
trespass to try title suit concerning 6221/ acres of land had resulted in a
judgment for plaintiff Freeman. In the subsequent suit one of the former
defendants asserted title to 1341/3 acres of land, all of which was embraced
in the prior judgment. By way of defense, Freeman claimed that the prior
judgment was a bar to the second action. However, the plaintiff in the sec-
ond suit countered by attempting to prove that the prior litigation actually
concerned only a boundary dispute, not a question of title to the property,
while the second suit was based solely on the issue of title. The Texas Su-
preme Court determined that the former judgment was a bar because each
suit involved the fundamental issue of title to the same land.
The plaintiff in Freeman was attempting to further refine the classic and
most narrow concept of cause of action, the individualized concept. There is,
at best, only a subtle distinction between a title suit which turns upon a bound-
ary dispute and a "pure" title suit concerning the very same land. The same
evidence was material to each suit, and the primary issue came under the
same rule of substantive law.
While the court in Freeman was faced with a situation which demanded
operation of the bar principle even under the narrow individualized concept,
the court offered additional discussion concerning when a prior judgment
should constitute a bar. The court stated: "A party cannot relitigate mat-
ters which he might have interposed, but failed to do, in a prior action be-
tween the same parties, or their privies, in reference to the same subject-
matter. '72 It was this reference to claims concerning the same "subject mat-
ter," coupled with an admonition to use "diligence" and "care" in asserting
all existing claims, which would lead to a broader reading of the opinion
in later years. 73
70. For a prior interpretation of the cause of action in several contexts, including
res judicata, see Keeton, supra note 55.
71. 87 Tex. 132, 27 S.W. 97 (1894).
72. Id. at 139, 27 S.W. at 100.
73. The Freeman rationale was expressly followed 43 years later in Permian Oil
Co. v. Smith, 129 Tex. 413, 107 S.W.2d 564 (1937). In Permian Oil Co. the majority
(in an opinion by Special Associate Justice Fouts) determined that although a prior
trespass to try title action was principally a boundary dispute, it was nevertheless a bar
under res judicata on a subsequent action for determination of title. Although the case
did involve collateral problems, the principal issue was identical to the question in Free-
man, and Freeman was considered as binding. Id. at 450-51, 107 S.W.2d at 568. In
a strong dissent by Chief Justice Cureton, it was stated that the trial judge surely must
not have intended to render an "India-rubber decree" which would bind not only the
land in dispute but all other land. Basically, the dissent urged adoption of the highly
refined view of the individualized concept which plaintiffs urged in Freeman, i.e., since
a title suit and a boundary suit are different in object and purpose, they should be con-
sidered as two distinct causes of action. Id. at 466, 107 S.W.2d at 576-77.
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A decade after Freeman a divided court handed down a second landmark
case on the bar/merger principle of res judicata which was styled Moore v.
Snowball.74 These two cases would serve as the foundation for subsequent
development of the doctrine by Texas courts.
In Snowball plaintiffs first brought a trespass to try title action, alleging
that a judgment of foreclosure (resulting from non-payment of property
taxes) and a subsequent sheriff's sale were void due to failure of required
service upon all parties in that action. Judgment was rendered for defend-
ants. Plaintiffs subsequently instituted a second suit in which they conceded
that the judgment and sale were not void, but sought to set aside the sher-
iff's sale. Plaintiffs alleged that the irregularity of the sale and the inade-
quacy of the price were grounds for vacating the sale. Defendant filed a
general denial and asserted that the prior judgment barred prosecution of
this second suit concerning the same land. The majority opinion held that
the second suit was not barred by res judicata.
The court was applying the individualized concept of cause of action.
The majority opinion reasoned that in the first action plaintiffs sought to
recover the land by asserting a legal claim for title of the property; the trial
court properly denied recovery under that claim and rendered judgment for
defendant. In the second action, the plaintiffs sought an altogether different
remedy; they were now asserting an equitable action to set aside the sale,
notwithstanding the prior determination that the judgment and sale were not
void.
In applying the individualized concept, the court emphasized that the two
actions were based upon different evidence, each sought a different form
of relief, and different judgments were applicable to each suit. According
to the majority's approach, res judicata should attach only when the matter
urged in a second suit was actually comprehended within the issues tendered
in the prior action. Thus, as plaintiffs' equitable relief was not available
under the actual pleadings and proof in the first action, the first suit did
not operate as a bar.
The court did acknowledge that abolition of the prior law/equity distinc-
tion and liberal joinder rules would have permitted plaintiff's joinder of both
actions. In light of the established principle that a judgment is final not
only as to matters actually determined but also as to "matters which might
have been litigated," why then was the second action not barred? In re-
sponding to this problem, the court interpreted the principle as applying only
to "matters which properly belong to a cause of action asserted in the pend-
ing suit;"'75 thus, the principle should not be interpreted as requiring joinder
of other causes of action respecting the same property. According to the
court, the latter interpretation would result in limiting the parties to a single
suit on the same property, and such a notion manifested too broad a reading
of the principle. Finally, the court did not consider it significant that plain-
tiffs were now asserting a cause of action which due to their own error was
74. 98 Tex. 16, 81 S.W. 5 (1904).
75. Id. at 24, 81 S.W. at 8.
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not alleged in the first suit. Thus, plaintiffs' admitted misconception of their
available remedy in the first action did not preclude their prosecuting a sec-
ond suit with a newly discovered basis for recovery.
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Brown vigorously argued that only one
cause of action existed; therefore, the first judgment should have barred any
subsequent prosecution of this matter by plaintiffs. The dissent emphasized
the liberal joinder available as a result of the merger of law and equity
courts and favored the definition of cause of action advocated by Pomeroy
and others. 76 Under the concept urged by the dissent, the majority opinion
failed to distinguish between a cause of action and a remedy. In both ac-
tions, plaintiffs attacked defendants' alleged unlawful possession of the prop-
erty; the object of both suits was to recover the land.
Judge Brown did not quarrel with the majority's finding that different evi-
dence was required to support each of the actions; however, the majority's
same evidence test seemed unpersuasive, for Judge Brown noted that dif-
ferent evidence was also necessary to support each material issue in any
case. Thus, the majority's myopic interpretation was the result of their con-
fusion between different issues and different causes of action. The dissent-
ing opinion maintained that the sole question in both actions was title and
right of possession, and thus plaintiffs should have urged every fact pertinent
to that issue. If the plaintiffs framed their first action so as to preclude
presentation of certain evidence supporting their right of recovery, it was
their misfortune. Thus, while the majority was willing to let plaintiffs cure
their initial oversight by bringing a second action, the dissenting view was
to let plaintiffs suffer the misfortune of their shortsightedness. Finally, it
was stated that the majority's interpretation would allow plaintiffs to bring
an independent action for every ground upon which they might attack the
judgment and sale. 77
The dissenting opinion clearly rejected the majority's use of the individual-
ized concept. While arguing in terms of Pomeroy's "primary right" defini-
tion, Judge Brown advocated a more pragmatic approach toward interpreta-
tion of the cause of action. The relationship of the two actions was such
that they should have been considered one operative unit; further, both
equity and policy considerations certainly weighed heavily in favor of re-
quiring joinder of the two actions.
The court in Freeman easily applied the individualized concept in the sit-
uation of two suits involving the same land; although the two suits were al-
legedly distinct actions, the court rejected this fine distinction and deter-
mined that only one cause of action for title existed. In Snowball the court
76. J. POMEROY, supra note 60, §§ 346-47; see note 60 supra.
77. 98 Tex. at 41, 81 S.W. at 18. On numerous occasions, the court has empha-
sized the importance of diligence of the parties in asserting their claims. For example,
in Freeman the court stated: "When a party passes by his opportunity, the law will
not aid him." 87 Tex. at 139, 27 S.W. at 100. The court then quoted with approval
a statement from an Ohio opinion: "By refusing to relieve parties against the conse-
quence of their own neglect, [the law] seeks to make them vigilant and careful. On
any other principle, there would be no end to an action, and there would be an end
to all vigilance and care in its preparation and trial." Id., quoting Ewing v. McNairy,
20 Ohio St. 315, 322 (1870).
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was faced with two suits which concerned ownership of the same property,
but the distinction between the legal and equitable actions was a sufficient
basis for considering them as two causes of action. The Snowball opinion
not only embraced the individualized concept, it also clearly rejected any
broader definition of cause of action. While the minority viewpoint in
Snowball forcefully articulated an adoption of a more pragmatic concept, the
clear thrust of the majority, in tandem with the language of Freeman, was
to establish that the individualized concept was the recognized manner by
which the court would determine what constituted a single cause of action.
In 1963, the case of Ogletree v. Crates7 8 required a supreme court inter-
pretation of the bar principle of res judicata in a wholly different factual
context. In Ogletree the issue before the court was proper custody of John
Ogletree, Jr., son of John Ogletree and his former wife, Margie Crates.
Ogletree and Mrs. Crates were married in 1953; the son was born in 1955.
In 1956, the couple was divorced by an Alabama court, with custody of
the son going to Mrs. Crates. The parties were remarried in 1956 and again
divorced in 1957; the 1957 divorce judgment included an agreement for
Mrs. Crates to have custody of John Ogletree, Jr., for limited periods, with
general custody of the boy being in Ogletree.
After certain changes in Ogletree's circumstances in 1958, Mrs. Crates
sought a modification of the 1957 divorce decree in the Alabama court;
since the court found that the prior agreement and decree should not be
disturbed, Mrs. Crates' petition was dismissed. Mrs. Crates later remar-
ried, moved to Texas, and in 1960, filed suit in Houston, Texas, for change
of custody based upon changed conditions. On July 15, 1960, the Houston
court denied relief to Mrs. Crates. In 1961, she obtained custody of John
Ogletree, Jr., for a limited time as provided by the 1957 judgment; upon
her refusal to return the child to Ogletree, Ogletree instituted a habeas cor-
pus proceeding.
Mrs. Crates asserted the right to sole custody on two grounds: (1) the
1957 Alabama judgment should be set aside as it was obtained by duress
and fraud; (2) changed conditions were a basis for now awarding her sole
custody. The court determined that since a final judgment in a custody pro-
ceeding is res judicata of the best interests of a child as to conditions then
existing, and because Mrs. Crates had failed to show any change of condi-
tions subsequent to the 1960 Houston court judgment, that judgment should
bar Mrs. Crates' present claim.79 Further, Mrs. Crates had sought to alter
the 1957 Alabama judgment both in that court in 1958, and in Houston
in 1960. However, since Mrs. Crates had knowledge of the facts surround-
ing the alleged fraud and duress when she brought the prior suits, her failure
to assert the claims on those occasions precluded her from now urging them.
In discussing the bar principle of res judicata, the court reiterated prin-
ciples from Freeman and Snowball. The court cited Freeman for its broad
language that res judicata bars not only issues actually litigated, but also
78. 363 S.W.2d 431 (Tex. 1963).
79. This was her second ground of relief. Id. at 434.
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issues connected with the cause of action which, with diligence, might have
been asserted. Snowball was said to have established the limitation that res
judicata would not bar a second suit which claimed a "technically different
cause of action."80
The court recognized that such a "technical distinction" might exist be-
tween Mrs. Crates' suit to modify a final judgment and her suit to set aside
the final judgment. However, such a distinction, resulting from the narrow
application of the individualized concept in Snowball, was not persuasive to
the court. In language more resembling the dissenting opinion in Snowball,
the court determined that the "broad" cause of action and "relief sought"
in both actions were identical. Further, public policy would favor the result
arrived at by the court, because the best interests of the child are promoted
by maintaining stability of the child's domicile and in avoiding subsequent
custody litigation. Finally, the court reasoned that one custody judgment
should bar those claims which the party could have urged, with diligence,
as grounds for obtaining custody.8'
The import of Ogletree lies in its recognition and rejection of the "tech-
nical" concept applied in Snowball. The court considered the individualized
concept, but chose a pragmatic approach instead. A suit for modification
of a final judgment and one for setting aside a final judgment could easily
be categorized as one operative unit under the pragmatic concept; in addi-
tion, the court gave considerable weight to more abstract considerations such
as the policy against relitigation in custody matters and diligence in assert-
ing all causes of actions which could have been urged in such a suit.
The next interpretation of the cause of action to be discussed here came
in Abbott Laboratories v. Gravis.82 The plaintiff allegedly suffered partial
paralysis and other disabilities as a result of various acts of negligence oc-
curring in connection with an abdominal operation. In the first suit, plain-
tiff had asserted numerous allegations of Abbott's negligence in the manu-
facture of pentothal sodium, a drug used in the spinal anesthetic. 83  Sum-
mary judgment was granted for defendant Abbott. 4
In the second action, plaintiff based her claim upon a products liability
theory, asserting that the pentothal sodium used intravenously was unfit for
use. Plaintiff claimed that the prior judgment, denying plaintiff's recovery
on a negligence theory, should not operate as a 'bar to plaintiff's subsequent
action based upon products liability. As an additional reason for allowing
the second action, plaintiff contended that her prior claim based upon use
of the drug in the spinal column was altogether different from the claim
arising from the drug being used intravenously. The court rejected plain-
tiff's attempt to apply the Snowball type of individualized concept. In look-
ing at the two actions, the court observed that they constituted one operative
80. Id. at 435-36.
81. Id. at 436.
82. 470 S.W.2d 639 (Tex. 1971).
83. In the first action, plaintiff also sued the hospital, the doctors, and the anesthe-




unit; both suits involved a tort resulting from use of the same drug, for the
same operation, and for the same purpose. Further, the court refused to
read plaintiff's pleading so narrowly as to consider the spinal column and
intravenous allegations as wholly different, and both matters certainly could
have been determined in the first suit.8 5
In applying a pragmatic concept of cause of action, the court also pro-
nounced important public policy considerations. Res judicata was designed
to expedite justice, terminate litigation and retain sanctity of judgments. The
court cited both Freeman and Ogletree for the proposition that all matters
in reference to the same subject matter, or all issues connected with a cause
of action, must be asserted in a single action. The Gravis opinion is con-
sistent with both the language and thrust of Ogletree. It is also evident that
'the court rejected the application of the individualized concept and adopted
the pragmatic approach.
In its recent opinion in Griffin v. Holiday Inns of America8 the Texas
Supreme Court clearly articulated the practical problems in determining
what constitutes a single cause of action. In Griffin plaintiff first sued de-
fendant Holiday Inn for recovery of an amount due under a paving con-
tract. Defendant claimed nonperformance by plain-tiff and counterclaimed
for damages resulting -from plaintiff's breach of contract. The trial court or-
dered that both plaintiff and defendant take nothing and the court of civil
appeals affirmed.87 Plaintiff then brought an action against defendant for
recovery under quantum meruit, for value of labor and services furnished
to defendant. While both the trial court and court of civil appeals 8 deter-
mined that the prior judgment operated as a bar on the second action, the
supreme court held that the actions for contract and quantum meruit consti-
tuted two distinct causes of action; therefore, res judicata would normally
not preclude prosecution of the second suit. However, the court affirmed
the lower courts, basing its judgment on rule 97 of the Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure. The rationale was that since the defendant had filed a counter-
claim in the first suit and plaintiff's quantum meruit claim arose out of
the same transaction that was the subject matter of defendant's counterclaim,
plaintiff's quantum meruit action was a compulsory counterclaim to de-
fendant's counterclaim and was required to be brought when the counter-
claim was filed under the provisions of rule 97.89
85. Id. at 642-43.
86. 496 S.W.2d 535 (Tex. 1973).
87. 452 S.W.2d 517 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1970).
88. 480 S.W.2d 506 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1972).
89. TEx. R. Civ. P. 97:
(a) Compulsory Counterclaims. A pleading shall state as a counter-
claim any claim within the jurisdiction of the court, not the subject of
a pending action, which at the time of filing the pleading the pleader has
against any opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction or occur-
rence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim and does
not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom
the court cannot acquire jurisdiction; provided, however, that a judgment
based upon a settlement or compromise of a claim of one party to the
transaction or occurrence prior to a disposition on the merits shall not
operate as a bar to the continuation or assertion of the claims of any
other party to the transaction or occurrence unless the latter has con-
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In rejecting the lower court determination that the contract action was
a bar to the subsequent quantum meruit suit, the court was able to recite
considerable authority establishing that two consecutive actions, each relat-
ing to one of these particular theories, were permissible and not to be pro-
hibited by the doctrine of res judicata.90 The court also analyzed the basis
for the lower court's misconception of past interpretation of the bar prin-
ciple in res judicata. From a literal reading of the language set forth in
Freeman and reiterated in Gravis, the lower court apparently determined
that since the quantum meruit action was a "matter which might have been
litigated" by plaintiff, his failure to assert the claim barred a subsequent
quantum meruit suit.
In effect, the lower court's liberal translation of Freeman and Gravis re-
sulted in an application of the broad procedural duty concept, i.e., all claims
and causes of action arising from the same transaction which are amenable
to joinder must be asserted in one action. The supreme court noted that
while such compulsory joinder does apply to counterclaims under rule 97,
Texas courts have not gone so far as to apply this principle"' to a plaintiff's
several claims arising from -the same transaction. Freeman spoke in terms
of a party failing to assert matters in reference to the same subject matter.
The court stated that the same subject matter refers to the same claim or
controversy in dispute in a prior action; thus while one is required to assert
every ground of recovery or defense relating to a cause of action, he is not
required to assert all claims and causes of action arising from the same trans-
action.
Most importantly, the court acknowledged the difficulty in determining
whether a subsequent suit deals with the same cause of action urged in a
prior suit. Since the court depended upon the established contract/quantum
meruit rule 92 regarding consecutive suits, it was not required to grapple with
the problem of defining the cause of action. However, a footnote reveals
that at least two members of the court favored a more pragmatic approach.93
They advocated a concept similar to that proposed by Schopflocher: 94 courts
should use an individualized concept in first determining what constitutes
sented in writing that said judgment shall operate as a bar.
The thrust of the dissenting opinion was directed at the majority's affirmance on this
point. The dissenting judge argued that neither party was aware of the significance
of rule 97 at the trial court; further, the point was never urged, argued, or briefed by
either party. For this reason, the dissenting opinion asserted that the court should not
affirm on such a point but should reverse without mention of rule 97. 496 S.W.2d
at 540.
90. In two older cases, Whitney v. Parish of Vernon, 154 S.W. 264 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Galveston 1913), error ref., and Henrietta Nat'l Bank v. Barrett, 25 S.W. 456(Tex. Civ. App. 1894), error ref., the court adopted an individualized concept of cause
of action in a contract/quantum meruit context. In both cases, plaintiffs were denied
recovery on a contract action; plaintiff's subsequent action for recovery under quantum
meruit against the same defendant was held not barred by res judicata. The court rea-
soned in each instance that the contract/quantum meruit actions were each based upon
different rules of substantive law, and each required different evidence. See also RE-
STATEMENT § 65, comment j, at 279-80.
91. L.e., the broad procedural duty concept.
92. See note 90 supra.
93. 496 S.W.2d at 538 n.l.
94. See Schopflocher 363-64, for more complete discussion.
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a single cause of action. If the causes of action are the same, the subse-
quent action is barred. If the causes are different, the court should consider
other factors in determining whether a procedural penalty (barring the sec-
ond suit) should be imposed. Thus, the cause of action dilemma is handled
not by ambiguous definition, but by procedural duty.9 5
On the heels of the Griffin decision the supreme court handed down
Westinghouse Credit Corp. v. Kownslar.96 Defendant, Mrs. Kownslar, guar-
anteed payment on several promissory notes executed by obligor to Westing-
house. By March of 1967 all nine notes were in default; Westinghouse
sued defendant on four of the notes. The trial court rendered judgment
for Westinghouse; the court of civil appeals affirmed. 97
In January 1971 Westinghouse again filed suit against defendant, now
seeking the amount due on the five remaining notes. Defendant claimed
that the second suit was barred by res judicata. According to defendant,
Westinghouse's action was based upon the guaranty contract which she ex-
ecuted; since a single contract existed, Westinghouse should have asserted
all of its claims in the first suit. On the other hand, Westinghouse reasoned
that each promissory note constituted a separate cause of action; therefore,
individual actions should be permitted. Further, it was well settled that
Westinghouse could bring separate suits against the original obligor; why
then should defendant enjoy an advantage not available -to the obligor?
As stated by the court, the only issue was the applicability of the doctrine
of merger. If Westinghouse's cause of action "merged" into the final judg-
ment, Westinghouse could not later assert claims which could have been liti-
gated in the prior suit. Having discovered no precedent upon which to base
its determination, the court attempted simply to balance the equities of the
situation. The result was application of the pragmatic concept, with primary
emphasis upon exigent policy considerations. 98
The court acknowledged two important purposes underlying the doctrine
of merger; by prohibiting a second suit, merger acts to prevent harassment
of defendants and discourages unnecessary waste of the court's time. In
the court's view, the two suits were not designed to vex the defendant, and
Westinghouse might well have had a business reason for bringing two ac-
tions. Further, defendant may have enjoyed some benefit from the West-
inghouse's delay in bringing the second action. 99 Finally, the court deter-
mined that in regard to the form of the transaction and prosecution of two
suits in this situation, "the risk of opportunity for abuse is so far offset by
the unlikelihood of its occurrence as not to warrant imposition of the severe
rule of merger."100 The court did not attempt to resolve the issue by defini-
95. In effect, this approach is a hybrid of the individualized concept and the broad
procedural duty concept.
96. 496 S.W.2d 531 (Tex. 1973).
97. Blount v. Westinghouse Credit Corp., 432 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1968).
98. The court seemed to be using the ad hoc policy determination approach, de-
scribed in note 60 supra.




tion or analysis of the causes of action involved. Instead, the court adopted
a policy oriented approach, with the decision based in part upon a deter-
mination of how the business community might view such a problem.' 0'
VI. CONCLUSION
In light of recent developments, where do Texas courts now stand on the
concept of cause of action in the res judicata context? It is evident that
there has been a progression, in both a temporal and philosophical sense,
from the Freeman and Snowball opinions at the turn of the century to the
most recent Griffin and Westinghouse cases. Without question, the recent
opinions manifest a more practical approach to the problem of determining
what constitutes a cause of action. The Ogletree and Gravis cases reject
the narrower individualized concept approach of earlier cases and embrace
application of the more progressive (albeit traditional) pragmatic concept;
additionally, the two most recent opinions, Griffin and Westinghouse, are
indicative of a trend -toward even more flexible theories. In Griffin, two
judges indicated a desire to move toward the more pragmatic approach
which would define the cause of action according to the individualized
concept, but preclude subsequent litigation on the basis of practical applica-
tion of a procedural penalty.'02 In the Westinghouse opinion, the court
adopted an ad hoc policy determination approach, 08 with primary emphasis
upon the equities, policy considerations and practical effects involved in its
determination.
It is important to recognize that the facts in a particular case, applicable
legal precedent, or a rule of procedure may control the outcome of a case,
irrespective of the theories and policy considerations discussed herein. For
example, in Griffin'04 an established rule on contract/quantum meruit ac-
tions was determinative of the "cause of action" issue, and the compulsory
counterclaim provision of rule 97105 became -the controlling principle in the
case. However, in light of the potential impact of res judicata on cases
in all areas of the law, careful and mature consideration should be given
to the expanding concepts that will influence and indeed may rule res judi-
cata in the future. There is good reason for the joinder of related claims
in one action; this approach should override the temptation to save for future
litigation those claims which might qualify, on technical grounds, as indi-
vidualized causes of action. This is but to say that it behooves the lawyer
of today not to fragment a cause of action or to fail to assert matters which
might be litigated in the current suit in expectation that he will have some-
thing left for a later, and perhaps more successful, day in court.
101. Id. at 533.
102. See Schopflocher 363-64.
103. See note 60 supra.
104. See note 89 supra.
105. TEX. R. Cv. P. 97; see note 89 supra.
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